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PIERRE GENEST
MEMORIAL LECTURE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY OF
CHIEF JUSTICE BRIAN DICKSON©
By ROBERT J. SHARPE*
Chief Justice Brian Dickson played a central role in the
elaboration of the fundamental values of the Canadian
Constitution. He took a balanced approach to
federalism, favouring neither federal nor provincial
claims and inviting cooperation through overlapping
jurisdiction. Dickson transformed the rule of law from a
background value to an operative constitutional
principle. His judgments on the rights of minorities
reflect a remarkable empathy for the plight of the
disadvantaged. Democracy informed all aspects of his
constitutional thinking. Dickson rejected the
contention that judicial review is anti-democratic, and
his constitutional legacy reflects a sustained effort to
harmonize all four fundament constitutional values.
Le juge en chef Brian Dickson a jou6 un r6le central
dans l'61aboration des valeurs fondamentiles de la
constitution canadienne. En adoptant une approche
6quilibrde vis-A-vis le f~dralisme, il n'a pas privil6gi6
les 6nonc s f6d~raux ou provinciaux, et il a encourag6
la cooperation A l'aide d'un chevauchement de
comp6tences. GrAce i Dickson, la primaut6 du droit,
un principe A l'arriare-plan, a 6t6 transform6 en
principe constitutionnel op~rationel. Ses jugements en
mati~re de droits des minorit~s reflatent une
remarquable facult6 de s'identifier au sort des
defavorises. La d6mocratie a influenc6 tous les aspects
de son raisonnement d'ordre constitutionnel. Dickson a
rejet6 les propos supposant que la rdvision judiciaire
6tait anti-ddmocratique, et son patrimoine
constitutionnel refl~te un effort soutenu dans le but
d'harmoniser les quatre valeurs constitutionnelles
fondamentales.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial career of Brian Dickson spanned a period of twenty-
seven years, from his appointment as a trial judge to the Manitoba Court
of Queen's Bench in 1963 to his retirement as Chief Justice of Canada in
1990.1 Those twenty-seven years, seventeen of which Dickson spent as a
member of our highest court, and six as Chief Justice of Canada, were a
period of significant, perhaps unprecedented, constitutional controversy.
We were confronted with a seemingly endless constitutional debate and
repeated calls for both renewal and reform. Canadians from all corners
presented each other with competing visions of their nation, the very
existence of which was put into question.
The debate was intensely political, but the courts could not, and
did not, escape involvement. Indeed, at critical points in our history we
witnessed judicial resolution of political impasses. In the Patriation
Reference2 in 1981, the Supreme Court determined that while the federal
government had the legal right to request the Parliament of Westminster
to amend the Constitution of Canada, convention required a substantial
consensus of the provinces. The political process responded to the
Court's direction. With patriation came the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms3 and its enhancement of the role of the judiciary in the
governance of Canada.
1 For a biographical sketch, see R. J. Sharpe, "Brian Dickson: Portrait of a Judge" (1998) 17:3
Advocates' Soc. J. 13 [hereinafter "Portrait"].
2 Reference Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753
[hereinafter Patriation Reference].
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
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During these tumultuous times, Brian Dickson played a central
role in the elaboration of our most fundamental constitutional values.
The product of his judicial work now constitutes an essential element of
the Canadian Constitution. In this lecture, I will consider the essential
features of his constitutional legacy.
To accomplish my task in the space of a single lecture, I will,
necessarily, take a broad-brush approach. To identify the essential
elements of Dickson's constitutional vision, I will organize my remarks
around the four basic principles of our Constitution that are immanent
in his work and that were specifically identified by the Supreme Court of
Canada in its monumental 1998 Secession Reference decision.4 As in the
Patriation Reference almost twenty years earlier, the Court was asked to
bring its judicial wisdom to bear on an apparently intractable
constitutional debate. To respond in a principled judicial fashion, the
Court probed the most fundamental principles of our Constitution to
identify what it described as "the vital unstated assumptions upon which
the text is based," its "internal architecture," and its "defining
principles." 5 In elaborating these fundamental constitutional principles,
the Court drew heavily on the judicial work of Brian Dickson, and so, I
suggest, it is appropriate for me to take those values as the organizing
principles for this assessment of his legacy.
The first basic principle of our Constitution is federalism-the
division of legislative power between the Parliament of Canada and the
provincial legislatures. The division of powers represents an attempt to
identify those aspects of our political life that unite us while preserving
appropriate scope to accommodate and to enhance the heterogeneous
social, cultural, and economic realities of our diverse and distinctive
provincial communities. Dickson's federalism jurisprudence, I will
suggest, demonstrates a remarkable balance between the competing
claims of federal and provincial authorities, perhaps unequalled by any
of his contemporaries.
The second basic principle, constitutionalism and the rule of law,
is an important abstract notion fundamental to the legal order of all
Western societies. During the Dickson era, the rule of law was
transformed from a vague abstraction to an operative constitutional
principle. As the pioneering architect of Charter jurisprudence, Dickson
made a unique contribution to a whole new era for Canadian
4 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [hereinafter Secession Reference].
5 Ibid. at 247-48.
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constitutionalism. His judgments established an enduring basic
framework for the elaboration of Charter rights and freedoms.
The third basic principle, the protection of minorities, is implicit
in the very nature of Canadian society, and an explicit feature of our
written Constitution. Dickson's elaboration of anti-discrimination
legislation, his commitment to the enhancement of minority language
rights, and his determination to see respected the rights and values of
our First Nations, made him a leading judicial exponent of this aspect of
our Constitution.
The fourth basic principle, democracy, is the bedrock value of
the Canadian Constitution. As the Supreme Court said in the Secession
Reference, democracy is "a fundamental value in our constitutional law
and political culture" and a "baseline against which the framers of our
Constitution, and subsequently, our elected representatives under it,
have always operated." 6 To some, the power of judicial review that flows
from the first three values-federalism, constitutionalism and the rule of
law, and the protection of minorities-conflicts with the values of
democracy.7 I will suggest that a significant element of Dickson's
constitutional legacy is the synthesis he achieved of all four fundamental
values. In Dickson's constitutional vision, the values protected by judicial
review were themselves informed and defined by the principle of
democracy. His work demonstrates that all four constitutional principles,
democracy included, work in harmony.
II. THE FOUR BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
A. Federalism
A striking feature of Dickson's federalism jurisprudenceS is the
extent to which he tended to uphold legislation challenged on federalism
grounds. To accomplish this end, he made use of a number of
interpretive principles.
6 Ibid. at 252-53.
7 See, for example, M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Legalization of
Politics in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Thompson, 1994); and R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, Charter
Politics (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1992).
8 See generally K.E. Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism: The
Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990); and K.E. Swinton, "Dickson and Federalism: In
Search of the Right Balance" (1991) 20 Man. L.J. 483.
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1. Deference and overlapping powers
Permeating Dickson's federalism judgments is a tendency to
show appropriate deference to the aims of the legislature. "We should
not," he said in a 1978 decision, "lightly decide that enabling legislation
is beyond the constitutional competence of the enacting body." 9 In
another 1978 judgment, the majority of the Court held that a
Saskatchewan well-head tax on oil was a constitutionally impermissible
interference with interprovincial trade. Dickson dissented, suggesting
that the Court should allow the legislatures freedom of action to
"safeguard their legitimate interests as in their wisdom they see fit."10 A
law benefits from the presumption of constitutionality and the party
attacking its validity bears the onus of proof. Dickson insisted that to
discharge that onus and displace the presumption, "the evidence must be
clear and unmistakable; more than conjecture or speculation is needed
to underpin a finding of constitutional incompetence."11
Given this posture of deference in federalism cases and his
inclination to interpret all elements of the Constitution generously,
Dickson was strongly attracted to what might be described as mediating
devices. The pith and substance doctrine stipulates that for federalism
purposes, a law is to be classified in terms of its core purpose. Provided
that core purpose falls within the legislative competence of the enacting
body, the law will not be rendered invalid by virtue of other incidental
features of the legislation that fall outside the powers of the enacting
body. In a 1989 decision,12 Dickson adopted Peter Hogg's crisp
statement of the principle, and observed that "a law which is federal in
its true nature will be upheld even if it affects matters which appear to be
a proper subject for provincial legislation .... "13
Dickson also made frequent reference to the so-called double
aspect doctrine, adopting the analysis of his former high school
9 See, for example, Di forio v. Warden of the Montreal Jail, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 152 at 200
[hereinafter Di lorio].
10 Canadian Industrial Gas & Oil Ltd. v. Saskatchewan, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 545 at 573.
I Ibid. at 573-74.
12 General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 8.C.R. 641 [hereinafter
General Motors].
13 Ibid. at 670, citing P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1985) at 334.
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classmate, the eminent constitutional scholar, William Lederman. 14 The
double aspect doctrine acknowledges that some legislative subjects fall
within both federal and provincial competence. Lederman explained that
where one aspect of a matter fell within a head of federal legislative
competence, but another aspect of the matter was within the provincial
sphere, and where "the contrast between the relative importance of the
two features is not so sharp," both laws could stand.1S Finding the
federal and provincial characteristics of a matter to be more or less
equal in importance, Dickson concluded that there was little reason "to
kill one and let the other live." 16
The application of these doctrines yielded many situations of
overlapping federal and provincial laws. Dickson welcomed this as a
natural result in a federal state, one that encouraged cooperation
between the two levels of government. He frequently observed in his
judgments that "overlap of legislation is to be expected and
accommodated in a federal state." 17 On this point as well, the seminal
thinking of Lederman was cited with approval: "[O]ur community
life-social, economic, political, and cultural-is very complex and will
not fit neatly into any scheme of categories or classes without
considerable overlap and ambiguity occurring. There are inevitable
difficulties arising from this that we must live with so long as we have a
federal constitution." 18 In a 1987 judgment,19 Dickson went so far as to
overrule an earlier Supreme Court decision that had "read down" an
otherwise valid municipal by-law on posting signs so that it would not
interfere with lawn signs posted in a federal election. 20 This form of
interjurisidictional immunity was inconsistent with Dickson's model of
federalism:
The history of Canadian constitutional law has been to allow for a fair amount of
interplay and indeed overlap between federal and provincial powers. [But it must be
14 See, for example, Multiple Access Ltd. v.McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 at 181-82
[hereinafter Multiple Access], adopting from W.R. Lederman, "Classification of Laws and the
British North America Act" in W.R. Lederman, ed., The Courts and the Canadian Constitution
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1964) 177 at 193.
15 MultipleAccess, supra note 14 at 182, adopting from W.R. Lederman, supra note 14 at 193.
1 6 Multiple Access, supra note 14 at 182.
1 7 See, for example, General Motors, supra note 12 at 669.
18 Multiple Access, supra note 14 at 180-81, quoting W.R. Lederman, "The Concurrent
Operation of Federal and Provincial Laws in Canada" (1963) 9 McGill LJ. 185 at 185.
1 9 O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (A.G.), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 [hereinafter OPSEU].
2 0 See MacKay v. R, [1965] S.C.R. 798.
194 [VOL 38 NO. I
The Constitutional Legacy of Brian Dickson
recognized] that doctrines like interjurisdictional and Crown immunity and concepts like
"watertight compartments" ... have not been the dominant tide of constitutional
doctrines; rather they have been an undertow against the strong pull of pith and
substance, the aspect doctrine and, in recent years, a very restrained approach to
concurrency and paramountcy issues.
21
Acceptance of overlapping federal and provincial legislation was
further enhanced by Dickson's narrow definition of paramountcy. This
judge-made rule provides that in the event of conflict between validly
enacted federal and provincial legislation, federal legislation prevails and
the provincial law is rendered inoperative to the extent of the conflict. In
a 1982 decision, Dickson was confronted with virtually identical
provincial and federal securities legislation regulating insider trading.
22
Both were held to be valid by application of the double aspect doctrine.
Describing duplication as "the ultimate in harmony," Dickson held that
"[m]ere duplication without actual conflict or contradiction is not
sufficient to invoke the doctrine of paramountcy and render otherwise
valid provincial legislation inoperative."23 He found that double recovery
of damages could be readily dealt with by the courts. He elaborated the
narrowest possible definition of paramountcy, limiting its application to
situations "where there is actual conflict in operation as where one
enactment says 'yes' and the other says 'no'; 'the same citizens are being
told to do inconsistent things'; compliance with one is defiance of the
other."24
2. Administration of justice
In the Constitution Act, 1867,25 section 91(27) allocates to
Parliament responsibility for the "Criminal law, except the Constitution
of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in
Criminal Matters" while section 92(14) gives the provinces responsibility
for "The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the
Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both
of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil
21 OPSEU, supra note 19 at 18.
22 See Multiple Access, supra note 14.
23 Ibid. at 190. Dickson acknowledges borrowing the phrase "the ultimate in harmony" from
Lederman.
24 Ibid. at 191.
25 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter Constitution
Act, 1867].
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Matters in those Courts." There is an obvious tension to resolve between
federal authority over the "criminal law" and "procedure in criminal
matters," and provincial competence in relation to "the administration
of justice in the province." Dickson saw these provisions as an attempt to
"effect a careful and delicate division of power between the two levels of
government in the field of criminal justice."26
In a series of cases that came before the Supreme Court in the
late 1970s and in the early 1980s, Dickson fought valiantly to define for
the provinces a core constitutional mandate with respect to the
administration of criminal justice. Although Dickson carried the
majority upholding the constitutional validity of a provincial inquiry into
organized crime over a strong dissenting opinion from Laskin C.J.,27 on
the whole, Dickson's views did not prevail and the arguments favouring
exclusive federal authority held sway with the majority. For example,
Dickson failed to persuade his colleagues that the provincial authority
extended to the investigation of the activities of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police within the province 28 or, most significantly, to the
prosecution of criminal offences. 29 Although he wrote in dissent in
Putnam, Hauser, and Wetmore, Dickson's reasons bear scrutiny today as
they illustrate two significant elements of his approach to constitutional
interpretation, namely, the use of history and the appeal to a functional
analysis.
While not an, adherent to the "original intent" school of
constitutional interpretation, which holds that the Constitution should
be given the same meaning today its drafters intended over a century
ago, 30 Dickson did refer to "the bargain struck at the time of
Confederation" 31 and often drew upon history as an interpretive aid. As
he said in one decision, "[a] page of history may illuminate more than a
book of logic."32 His judgments in this area contain references to the
2 6 R. v. Wetmore, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 284 at 305 [hereinafter Wetmore].
2 7 See Di lorio, supra note 9.
28 SeeAlberta (A.G.) v. Putnam, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 267 [hereinafter Putnam].
2 9 See R. v. Hauser, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984 [hereinafter Hauser]; and Wetmore, supra note 26.
30 See, for example, British Columbia (A.G.) v. Canada Trust, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 466 at 479: "If
the Canadian Constitution is to be regarded as a 'living tree' and legislative competence as
'essentially dynamic' (per Beetz J. in Martin Service Station Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 996 at
1006), then the determination of categories existing in 1867 becomes of little, other than historic,
concern."
31 Hauser, supra note 29 at 1032.
32 Wetmore, supra note 26 at 299.
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speeches of Sir John A. Macdonald, to legislative history, and to
practices prevalent at the time of Confederation. 33
Dickson fortified the historical approach with a functional
analysis to consider which level of government could best deal with the
matter at hand. He did not hesitate to conclude that, from a functional
perspective, it made sense to locate criminal prosecutorial authority at
the provincial level so that prosecution policies would be sensitive to
local needs and concerns.
Although Dickson was unable to persuade his colleagues with
these arguments, I think it fair to say that most commentators have
pronounced favourably upon the position he took.34 Moreover, since the
federal Crown has delegated prosecutorial authority over most offences
to the provincial attorneys general, the overlapping cooperative scheme
envisioned by Dickson has largely been achieved in practice.
3. Trade and commerce
It is ironic that the same case 35 that dealt the death blow to
Dickson's plea for provincial control over the administration of justice
served as the starting point for his significant achievement in elaborating
a workable theory to embrace general federal economic regulatory
authority under the trade and commerce power. An early Privy Council
decision 36 held that there were two branches to the trade and commerce
power; first, the regulation of interprovincial and international trade;
33 See, for example, Putnam, supra note 28 at 293-94, quoting Sir John A. Macdonald on local
policing; and Wetmore, supra note 26 at 281:
If constitutional history teaches us anything it teaches that the Fathers of Confederation
wished the substantive criminal law to be enacted at the federal level (s. 91(27) of the
BNA Act) but the administration of justice within the provinces (s. 92(14)) both criminal
and civil justice, to be at the local level. And for very good reasons of policy. The
maintenance of law and order is inherently of local concern. It is best managed by local
officials, sensitive to the needs and idiosyncracies of the community. The Fathers of
Confederation recognized that it simply would not do for officials in Ottawa to be
enforcing laws throughout the Dominion. The federal Parliament had the power to
define the content of the general rules. But the enforcement of the rules requires, at the
34 See, for example, P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law, looseleaf edition (Toronto: Carswell,
1997), at 19.6(b); A. Petter, "Constitutional Law: Rearranging the Administration of Criminal
Justice" (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 162; and J.D. Whyte, "The Administration of Criminal Justice and
the Provinces" (1984) 38 C.R. (3d) 184.
35 Canada (A.G.) v. Canadian National Transportation LtcL, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206 [hereinafter
Canadian National].
36 See Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.).
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and second, the "general regulation of trade affecting the whole
Dominion."3 7 While there was a relatively well-developed body of
jurisprudence elaborating the extent of federal power under the first
branch, the courts had failed to articulate a workable test for the second
branch.
Dickson was keenly interested in economic issues. Before he
became a judge, he had carried on a sophisticated commercial and
corporate law practice and he had served as a director on the board of a
chartered bank. As a member of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, he
decided no fewer than four cases involving the trade and commerce
power,38 and in one case, he discerned a trend towards its broadening 3 9
His combined business and legal experience led him to believe that there
were economic issues, national in scope, affecting the "economy as a
single integrated national unit"40 transcending provincial interests and
provincial competence. At the same time, he saw the issue as being one
of balance, due to his strong belief in the need to protect provincial
jurisdiction over the regulation of businesses, trades, and local economic
activity. The challenge was to unlock the constitutional barrier to federal
regulatory power, but to do so in a way that would not imperil "the local
autonomy in economic regulation contemplated by the Constitution." 41
A balance had to be struck between, on the one hand, an all-pervasive
interpretation of the federal power that would overwhelm the regulatory
powers of the provinces in relation to their own local economic activities,
and, on the other hand, "an interpretation that renders the general trade
and commerce power to all intents vapid and meaningless." 42
In achieving that balance, Dickson built upon the efforts of a
1977 Laskin C.J. decision,43 which identified the elements for a valid
exercise of the general branch of the federal trade and commerce power:
a general regulatory scheme monitored by the continuing oversight of a
3 7 1bid. at 113.
38 See R. v. Loblaws Groceterias Co. (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 225 (Man. C.A.); Reference Re
Interprovincial Trade Restrictions on Agricultural Commodities (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 326 (Man.
C.A.) [hereinafter Interprovincial Trade Restrictions]; Gershman Produce Co. v. Manitoba Marketing
Board (1971), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 320 (Man. C.A.); and Manitoba (A.G.) v. Bums Foods Ltd. (1973), 35
D.L.R. (3d) 581 (Man. C.A.).
3 9 lnterprovincial Trade Restrictions, supra note 38 at 333.
40 Canadian National, supra note 35 at 267.
41 Ibid. at 277.
42 General Motors, supra note 12 at 660.
43 See MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134.
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regulatory agency and concerned with trade as a whole rather than with
a particular industry. To "ensure that federal legislation does not upset
the balance of power between federal and provincial governments,"
Dickson added two further crucial elements directly focusing on the
dimensions of the problem being addressed in relation to provincial
capacity: "(i) the legislation should be of a nature that the provinces
jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of enacting; and
(ii) the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in a
legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of the
scheme in other parts of the country."44 The reference to provincial
incapacity, a device later employed to allow for a contained expansion of
the federal residual peace, order, and good government power,45
maintained the balance Dickson sought, protecting provincial regulatory
authority while affording scope for federal initiatives aimed at the
national economy as a whole.
4. Federalism: Conclusion
Dickson adopted a balanced approach to the challenges of
federalism. He was generally unwilling to read any provision of the
Constitution narrowly, and leaned decidedly in favour of a judicially
deferential approach, upholding legislation if at all possible. He
accomplished this by accepting-indeed encouraging-overlapping
legislative authority, and he made liberal use of the mediating devices of
pith and substance analysis, the double aspect doctrine, and a very
narrow scope for federal paramountcy. From a doctrinal perspective, the
two most significant aspects of Dickson's federalism jurisprudence are
his valiant effort to define a broad role for the provinces in relation to
the administration of criminal justice, and his great achievement in the
elaboration of the federal power in relation to trade and commerce.
Dickson's functional approach to federalism, seeking if possible to locate
authority at the level he perceived to be most adept at dealing with the
problem, avoided any apparent inclination or predisposition to favour
either the federal or provincial authorities. He differed from the two
other dominant judicial thinkers on federalism with whom he served,
Chief Justice Bora Laskin, who leaned distinctly towards the federal
side, and Justice Jean Beetz, who took a decidedly more provincial
44 General Motors, supra note 12 at 662.
45 See R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401.
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approach and insisted upon a sharper demarcation of jurisdictional
limits.
B. Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law
1. The rule of law
The ideal of the rule of law was fundamental to Dickson's
conception of Canada's Constitution. In a speech given in 1985, Dickson
described his understanding of the rule of law in the following terms:
The meaning of the Rule of Law is very simple and well known to us all: the law must
stand supreme as the source and fabric of all social organization. It is the law which
provides the framework for relations among individuals as well as between the individual
and the state: the law delineates the scope of each person's liberties and responsibilities
and defines the powers and duties of government. All obligations imposed on the
individual and all restrictions upon his or her liberty must be justified by law. This is the
most fundamental guarantee of equality and freedom we have achieved as a society. The
Rule of Law protects individuals from arbitrary and capricious treatment at the hands of
government and fosters confidence in each of us that the power of government to
interfere with our lives is finite and ascertainable. It allows us to live together in freedom
and harmony and provides the common ground for social progress and prosperity.
46
Dickson had a profound belief that this liberal structure was essential for
social order in a democratic society.
While always an implicit element of the legal and judicial
order,47 the rule of law took concrete form in Dickson's era.48 In a series
46 "The Rule of Law: Judicial Independence and the Separation of Powers" (Canadian Bar
Association, 21 August 1985) [unpublished, archived: National Archives of Canada, MG31 E85 vol.
137 file 27] [hereinafter "Rule of Law"].
47 For an example of the use of the rule of law as a background interpretive principle, see
Dickson's dissent in Dedman v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2, on the validity of random stops to investigate
for drinking and driving. Dickson writes, at 10, that it is a "fundamental tenet of the rule of law in
this country that the police ... have limited powers and are only entitled to interfere with the liberty
or property of the citizen to the extent authorized by law." He continues, at 15:
A police officer is not permitted to execute his or her duty by unlawful means. The public'
interest in law enforcement cannot be allowed to override the fundamental principle that
all public officials, including the police, are subject to the rule of law. To find that
arbitrary police action is justified simply because it is directed at the fulfillment of police
duties would be to sanction a dangerous exception to the supremacy of law. It is the
function of the legislature, not the courts, to authorize arbitrary police action that would
otherwise be unlawful as a violation of rights traditionally protected at common law.
48 See J. Fremont, "The Dickson Court, the Courts, and the Constitutional Balance of Powers
in the Canadian System of Government" (1991) 20 Man. L.J. 451 at 465-71.
[VOL. 38 NO, I
The Constitutional Legacy of Brian Dickson
of cases, commencing with the Manitoba Language Reference,49 the rule
of law was transformed from a rather vague background concept to an
operative and, in the event of conflict, overriding and governing
constitutional principle. The Court found that the Manitoba legislature
had failed to respect the French language guarantees entrenched at the
time the province joined Confederation by enacting laws in English only.
As a result, the Court found the province's entire statute book invalid
and of no effect. This consequence of upholding the guaranteed
language right was alarming: would the entire legal regime of the
province collapse in order to vindicate this constitutionally protected
right? The Court could not countenance such a result, as it would
"deprive Manitoba of its legal order and cause a transgression of the rule
of law."S0 The Court held that "[flor the Court to allow such a situation
to arise and fail to resolve it would be an abdication of its responsibility
as protector and preserver of the Constitution."51 The Court determined
that rather than undermine the entire legal order, it would have to
sanction the violation of rights for a period sufficient to allow Manitoba
to translate its laws and to bring itself into compliance with the demands
of the Constitution. Thus, in the event of a conflict between a specific
constitutional right and a threat to the entire legal order, the rule of law
prevails as the Constitution's dominant and governing principle.
A similar line of thinking motivated Dickson's judgment in a
1988 decisionS2 upholding the validity of an injunction to prevent
picketing of a courthouse over the picketers' claim of a violation of
Charter rights. In Dickson's view, to the extent that they existed, the
individual Charter rights of the picketers could not trump the general
public's right to have access to the courts, a right he saw as essential to
the rule of law and as "one of the foundational pillars protecting the
rights and freedoms of our citizens."5 3 The rule of law and the rights of
all had to prevail over the exercise of individual rights by a few: "The
Charter surely does not self-destruct in a dynamic of conflicting rights."5 4
49 Reference re Language Rights Under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of Constitution
Act, 1867, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 [hereinafter Manitoba Language Reference].
50 Ibid. at 753.
51 Ibid.
52 B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214.
53 Ibid. at 230, quoting the judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, below:
B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (A.G.), 20 D.LR. (4th) 399 (B.C. C.A.).
54 Ibid. at 249.
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Another example of the prevalence of the rule of law over
individual rights is provided by Dickson's elaboration in R. v. Big M Drug
Mart Ltd.55 of the broad rule for standing to raise a Charter claim. The
Crown argued that since the accused was a corporation, it could not
demonstrate a sufficient interest to invoke the guarantee of freedom of
religion. Dickson did not suggest that corporations could have a religion,
but he did insist that the Court could not countenance a conviction
under an unconstitutional statute: "[N]o one can be convicted of an
offence under an unconstitutional law." 56 Big M Drug Mart, he
observed, was not a busybody that invoked the process of the Court to
challenge the law, but rather found itself charged with an offence:
Any accused, whether corporate or individual, may defend a criminal charge by arguing
that the law under which the charge is brought is constitutionally invalid. ... A law which
itself infringes religious freedom is, by that reason alone, inconsistent with section 2(a) of
the Charter and it matters not whether the accused is a Christian, Jew, Muslim, Hindu,
Buddhist, atheist, agnostic or whether an individual or a corporation. It is the nature of
the law, not the status of the accused, that is in issue.5 7
Dickson viewed the rule of law as a fundamental aspect of our
legal and political order. He found an abstract principle, and he left, as
part of his legacy, an operative rule capable of trumping more specific
constitutional values where necessary to preserve the legal order.
2. Independence of the judiciary and judicial review
In Dickson's mind, the role of the courts as guardian of the
constitutional order was an essential element of the rule of law. In
Beauregard v. Canada he described the courts as:
protector of the Constitution and the fundamental values embodied in it-rule of law,
fundamental justice, equality, preservation of the democratic process, to name perhaps
the most important. In other words, judicial independence is essential for fair and just
dispute-resolution in individual cases. It is also the lifeblood of constitutionalism in
democratic societies. 58
Dickson saw an independent judiciary with the power of judicial
review as implicit in the rule of law, and as a necessary element to the
realization of the values of federalism, to the protection of individual
55 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M].
5 6 Ibid. at 313.
5 7Ibid. at 313-14.
58 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 70.
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rights and freedoms, to the protection of minorities and, as I suggest
later in this lecture, to the realization of democracy itself.S9
Although he tended to be deferential in federalism cases, he did
not hesitate to assert the fundamental importance of judicial review
when faced with a provincial attempt to immunize legislation from
scrutiny in Amax Potash Ltd. v. Saskatchewan.6 O Dickson wrote that
while the courts would not question the wisdom of legislation, "it is the
high duty of this Court to ensure that the Legislatures do not transgress
the limits of their constitutional mandate and engage in the illegal
exercise of power."61 A statute immunizing the province from suit for
the return of money paid under an unconstitutional tax presented a
direct challenge to the division of powers under Canada's federal
constitution: "To allow moneys collected under compulsion, pursuant to
an ultra vires statute, to be retained would be tantamount to allowing the
provincial Legislature to do indirectly what it could not do directly, and
by covert means to impose illegal burdens." 62
Dickson read the section 52 supremacy clause, included in the
Constitution Act, 1982,63 as charging the courts with a positive obligation
to vindicate protected rights and freedoms. He frequently referred to the
duty of the court to uphold the Constitution.64 While he concurred with
the Court's judgment in Dolphin Delivery65 limiting the application of the
Charter to government activity, he did not hesitate to ensure that the
Charter reached all aspects of governmental decisionmaking. In
Operation Dismantle v. R.,66 Dickson insisted that the Charter must apply
to all decisions of government, even those of the Cabinet in highly
sensitive and highly political areas. The case involved a challenge to the
federal Cabinet's decision to permit the United States to test cruise
missiles in Canadian territory, a decision alleged to violate the right to
life and personal security guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter. While
that claim was dismissed on the ground that the facts alleged to support
59 See Part II(D), below.
60 [19771 2 S.C.R. 576.
61 Ibid. at 590.
62 Ibid.
63 Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].
64 See, for example, "Rule of Law," supra note 46: "When a law is inconsistent with the
Charter the courts must not hesitate to strike it down. The fulfillment of the grand objectives which
inspired the Charter is dependent in large measure on the strength and fortitude of the judiciary."
6 5 R. W.D.S. U., Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
66 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
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the claim were matters of speculation and conjecture incapable of proof,
Dickson rejected the contention that Cabinet decisions should be
immunized from review: "I have no doubt that disputes of a political or
foreign policy nature may be properly cognizable by the courts." 67
3. Constitutionalism and the structure
of Charter interpretation
While only time will tell which aspect of Dickson's constitutional
legacy will be most long-lasting, there is little doubt that the present
generation is most indebted to him for his design of the basic
architecture of Charter interpretation. It is easy to forget that when the
Charter was introduced in 1982, there was considerable uncertainty
about many basic issues. Would the courts repeat the experience of the
Canadian Bill of Rights68 and interpret rights and freedoms narrowly, or
would the courts see the Charter as a bold new initiative and read the
constitutional guarantees generously? If rights were generously
interpreted, how would the courts accommodate limitations implicit in
the social order: by imposing definitional limitations on the rights
themselves, or through the section 1 general limitations clause? How
exacting would the courts be in assessing the claims of government that
rights should be limited in order to advance broader social and economic
objectives? To these, and many other, basic questions there were no
certain answers.
In three seminal judgments, Hunter v. Southam Inc.,69 Big M,70
and R. v. Oakes,71 Dickson laid out the broad contours of the
interpretive approach to be followed. It was clear from these decisions
that the Dickson Court would not repeat the disappointing performance
of its predecessors under the Bill of Rights.72 In Hunter, Dickson
identified the essence of a constitution in eloquent terms:
A constitution ... is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a
continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when
joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights
6 7Ibid. at 459.
68 S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix III [hereinafter Bill of Rights].
69 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [hereinafter Hunter].
70 Supra note 55.
71 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
72 Supra note 68. For a more g6neral discussion, see note 121, infra, and accompanying text.
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and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must,
therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political
and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of
the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in
mind.73
Drawing upon the metaphor of the constitution as a living tree,
capable of expansion and growth within its natural limits, Dickson
elaborated the "purposive" approach to Charter interpretation:
I begin with the obvious. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive
document. Its purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines. It is intended to constrain
governmental action inconsistent with those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an
authorization for governmental action.74
Dickson built upon this foundation in the Big M case, where he
described the purposive approach in a passage now familiar to all
students of the Constitution:
In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or freedom in
question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger objects of the Charter
itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical
origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of
the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the
Charter. The interpretation should be ... a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at
fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the
Charter's protection. At the same time it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose
of the right or freedom in question, but to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a
vacuum, and must therefore ... be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and
historical contexts.75
The purposive approach yielded a definition of freedom of
religion that was generous and sensitive to the situation of religious
minorities:
Freedom must surely be founded in respect for the inherent dignity and the inviolable
rights of the human person.... Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of
coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices. Freedom means
that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in
a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience. 76
73 Hunter, supra note 69 at 155.
74 Ibid. at 156.
75 Big M, supra note 55 at 344.
76 Ibid. at 336-37.
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The purposive approach formed the cornerstone of Charter
interpretation, but alone it was incomplete. The most difficult issue in
the interpretation of Charter rights is reconciling the rights of the
individual with the competing rights of others and with the interests of
the community at large. The problem is especially acute where rights are
broadly defined, as they were likely to be following the purposive
approach. The language of section 1 provides the general concept for
limiting Charter rights and freedoms, but it required a magisterial
judicial effort to flesh out the meaning of "reasonable limits prescribed
by l.aw as can be justified in a free and democratic society." In Oakes,77
Dickson provided the second foundational element of Charter
interpretation. Dickson held that while the initial burden of proving a
violation of rights rests with the individual asserting a Charter violation,
once a prima facie violation is proved, the burden shifts to the party
attempting to justify the infringement as a reasonable limit. It is at the
justification stage that the court must consider the interest in limiting a
right or freedom, and weigh collective interests or the competing rights
of other individuals against the right of the claimant. The reconciliation
of the competing interests against individual rights, Dickson wrote, is to
be achieved by a "stringent standard of justification"78 focusing on the
legitimacy of the government's objective and the "proportionality"
between the means chosen to achieve that objective and the burden on
the rights claimant.
The language of Oakes is familiar to all who are concerned with
the Charter, but given the elegance of the test prescribed by Dickson, it
bears repetition here:
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in
question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In
short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if
rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair "as little as
possible" the right or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality
between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or
freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of 'sufficient importance'. 79
Purposive interpretation and the Oakes proportionality test do
not, of course, mechanically resolve all issues of Charter interpretation.
As with the text of the Charter itself, they must take their shape over
time in the specific context of both the right or freedom at issue and the
77 Supra note 71.
78 Ibid at 136.
79 1bd. at 139.
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competing values for which justification is claimed. They remain,
however, the essential touchstones of Charter adjudication. They have
become a fully integrated part of Canada's Constitution and represent a
monumental legacy to constitutionalism in Canada.
C. Protection of Minorities
The protection of minorities is one of the most notable features
of Dickson's contribution to Canadian law. He wrote landmark
judgments on anti-discrimination law, minority language rights, and
Aboriginal rights. His work in this area demonstrates a remarkable
empathy with the victims of discrimination and an ability to see the
world and its problems through the eyes of Canada's most vulnerable
people. In this lecture, I can do little more than sketch some of the
highlights.
1. Anti-discrimination law
Although he wrote only one judgment on the Charters section 15
equality rights guarantee,8 0 Dickson's human rights jurisprudence
pushed our law significantly forward in its attempt to come to grips with
various forms of discrimination. He dealt with the thorny issues of
systemic discrimination and affirmative action in the Action Travail des
Femmes case.8 1 Various women filed a complaint with the Canadian
Human Rights Commission alleging systemic discrimination in the hiring
practices of the Canadian National Railway Company (CN). The
Commission imposed an employment equity program designed to
address both the negative stereotypes about working women, and the
respondent's lack of commitment to deal with the strikingly low number
of women in its workforce. It ordered CN to hire a minimum of one
woman for every four people hired in non-traditional positions in each
quarter until women comprised thirteen per cent of the company's
workforce. In upholding the Human Rights Commission's order,
Dickson rejected a "fault based" approach to discrimination on the
ground that it "failed to respond adequately to the many instances where
the effect of policies and practices is discriminatory even if that effect is
80 See R. v. S.(S.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254.
81 See Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),
[198711 S.C.R. 1114 [hereinafter Action TravaildesFemmes].
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unintended and unforeseen." 82 Referring to the Abella Report,83 he
identified systemic discrimination as
discrimination that results from the simple operation of established procedures of
recruitment, hiring and promotion, none of which is necessarily designed to promote
discrimination. The discrimination is then reinforced by the very exclusion of the
disadvantaged group because the exclusion fosters the belief, both within and outside the
group, that the exclusion is the result of "natural" forces, for example, that women "just
can't do the job" (see the Abella Report at pp. 9-10). To combat systemic discrimination,
it is essential to create a climate in which both negative practices and negative attitudes
can be challenged and discouraged.84
In Dickson's view, the Commission was entitled to impose the remedy of
an employment equity program
designed to break a continuing cycle of systemic discrimination. The goal is not to
compensate past victims or even to provide new opportunities for specific individuals who
have been unfairly refused jobs or promotion in the past: [but] ... an attempt to ensure
that future applicants and workers from the affected group will not face the same
insidious barriers that blocked their forebears.85
Dickson furthered the law's understanding of gender
discrimination in two 1989 decisions, holding that both sexual
harassment 86 and the denial of sick leave benefits to a pregnant woman87
constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. In the sexual harassment
case, he wrote that sexual harassment in the workplace is "unwelcome
conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work
environment or leads to adverse job-related consequences ... . [I]t is an
abuse of both economic and sexual power ... [and] a profound affront to
the dignity of the employees forced to endure it."88 In the pregnancy
case, Dickson held that "it is unfair to impose all of the costs of
pregnancy upon one half of the population" and found that "those who
bear children and benefit society as a whole thereby should not be
economically or socially disadvantaged ... ."89 Dickson expressly
82 Ibid. at 1135.
83 R.S. Abella, Report of the Commission on Equality in Employment, (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1984).
8 4Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 81 at 1139.
85Ibid. at 1143.
86 Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 [hereinafter Janzen].
8 7 Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 [hereinafter Brooks].
88 Janzen, supra note 86 at 1284.
89 Brooks, supra note 87 at 1243.
[VOL. 38 NO. I208
The Constitutional Legacy of Brian Dickson
overruled the notorious Bliss case,90 decided ten years earlier, in which
the Supreme Court held that a pregnancy-based disadvantage did not
constitute sex discrimination.
The depth of Dickson's understanding of gender issues is further
demonstrated by his decision in R. v. Morgentaler91 where he found the
Criminal Code prohibition of abortion 92 a violation of the section 7 right
to security of the person: "Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal
sanction, to carry a foetus to term unless she meets certain criteria
unrelated to her own priorities and aspirations, is a profound
interference with a woman's body and thus a violation of security of the
person." 93
Dickson led a life of material prosperity and privilege, but he had
a remarkable empathy for victims of discrimination and he seemed able
to see the world through the eyes of others. For instance, when dealing
with Sunday closing laws, his personal Christian beliefs did not prevent
him from seeing the situation from the perspective of the believer of a
minority religion. It is significant, I suggest, that in a key passage, he
expressed the minority perspective in the first person:
If I am a Jew or a Sabbatarian or a Muslim, the practice of my religion at least implies my
right to work on a Sunday if I wish. It seems to me that any law purely religious in
purpose, which denies me that right, must surely infringe my religious freedom. 9 4
2. Language rights
Dickson had a strong belief in the importance of respecting and
building upon the historic rights of Canada's French-speaking
population. He saw language as "more than a mere means of
communication, it is part and parcel of the identity and culture of the
people speaking it."95 The Manitoba Language Reference,96 exemplifies
this understanding. In Socijtt des Acadiens v. Association of Parents for
Fairness in Education,97 a case dealing with section 19(2) of the Charter
9 0 Bliss v. Canada (A.G.), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
91 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler].
92 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 251.
93 Supra note 91 at 56-57.
9 4 Big M, supra note 55 at 338.
95 Mahi v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342 at 362 [hereinafter Mahg].
96 Supra note 49.
97 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549 [hereinafter Socit6 desAcadiens].
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guaranteeing the right of New Brunswickers to use either official
language in the courts of the province, the majority of the Court rejected
the proposition that this guarantee included the right to have one's case
heard by a judge who could understand the litigant's language of choice
without the aid of an interpreter. In his strongly worded dissenting
judgment, Dickson disagreed with the majority view that language rights
were to be narrowly interpreted. Writing for the majority, Beetz argued
that language rights were the product of political compromise as
distinguished from other Charter rights that are "seminal in nature
because they are rooted in principle."9 8 For Beetz, this difference
dictated a cautious approach to the development of Language rights. In
contrast, Dickson wrote that
[I]inguistic duality has been a longstanding concern in our nation. Canada is a country
with both French and English solidly embedded in its history. The constitutional language
protections reflect continued and renewed efforts in the direction of bilingualism. In my
view, we must take special care to be faithful to the spirit and purpose of the guarantee of
language rights enshrined in the Charter.99
He added:
What good is a right to use one's language if those to whom one speaks cannot
understand? Though couched in individualistic terms, langubge rights, by their very
nature, are intimately and profoundly social. We speak and write to communicate to
others. In the courtroom, we speak to communicate to the judge or judges. It is
fundamental, therefore, to any effective and coherent guarantee of language rights in the
courtroom that the judge or judges understand, either directly or through other means,
the language chosen by the individual coming before the court.100
Dickson's views on language rights did carry a majority in Mahd
v. Alberta,lOl which dealt with the section 23 guarantee of minority
language education rights. Describing section 23 as the "linchpin in this
nation's commitment to the values of bilingualism and biculturalism," 102
he avoided the narrow approach of the majority in Socijtd des Acadiens,
stressing the remedial component of the section 23 guarantee and the
importance of schools as community centres for linguistic and cultural
activities. While accepting that language rights were different from other
rights and that they were to be carefully interpreted, he held that "this
does not mean that courts should not 'breathe life' into the expressed
98 Ibid. at 578, Beetz J.
99 Ibid. at 564.
10 0 Ibi. at 566.
101 Supra note 95.
102 Ibid. at 350.
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purpose of the section, or avoid implementing the possibly novel
remedies needed to achieve that purpose."103 Dickson provided a liberal
and flexible interpretation of the "where numbers warrant" requirement
of section 23, opting for a "sliding scale" that guarantees the level of
rights and services appropriate to the number of students involved. He
also found that the Charter entitled minority language communities to an
appropriate level of management and control of their children's schools.
3. Aboriginal rights
Dickson's interest in Aboriginal issues was longstanding and his
contribution significant. He wrote many judgments on hunting, fishing,
and treaty rights, tending to favour a generous interpretation of
Aboriginal rights, while factoring in the need to balance regulation in the
interests of society at large. Even before the entrenchment of Aboriginal
rights in the Constitution Act, 1982 he wrote of the need to accord
"priority to Indian food fishing and some priority to limited commercial
fishing over the competing demands of commercial and sport fishing."10 4
In Nowegi ick v. R.O5 he insisted that treaties and statutes be interpreted
generously to reflect Aboriginal interests, having "regard to [the]
substance and the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used,
rather than to forensic dialectics."10 6
Dickson's judgments in Guerin v. R.107 and in R. v. SparrowlOS
were truly seminal. In Guerin, he characterized Aboriginal interests in
land as "a pre-existing legal right not created by Royal Proclamation, by
... the Indian Act, or by any other executive order or legislative
provision."109 His recognition of the independent historical and cultural
basis for Aboriginal title was accompanied by his characterization of a
fiduciary relationship owed by the Crown to the Aboriginal peoples of
Canada. He described this fiduciary obligation, like the Aboriginal
interest in land it is intended to protect, as sui generis. It arises from the
historic relationship between the Crown and the First Nations and from
103 Ibid. at 365.
104 Jack v. R., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 294 at 311.
105 [19831 1 S.C.R. 29.
106 Ibid. at 41.
107 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 [hereinafter Guerin].
108 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter Sparrow].
109 Guerin, supra note 107 at 379.
2000]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the inalienability of Aboriginal title except by way of surrender to the
Crown.
In Sparrow, Dickson dealt with section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, which recognizes and affirms "the existing Aboriginal and treaty
rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada." In an opinion he co-wrote
with Justice La Forest, he rejected the contention that the guarantee of
"existing" Aboriginal and treaty rights froze them precisely as they
existed in regulated form in 1982. Dickson opted for a flexible
interpretation that would allow evolution over time and require
justification of all limitations, whenever imposed. Echoing the spirit of
Nowegijick, he wrote that section 35 was to be given "a generous, liberal
interpretation"11o and, adopting the fiduciary analysis of Guerin, he
imposed a fiduciary standard on the government when it seeks to justify
measures limiting Aboriginal rights. He observed that "[o]ur history has
shown, unfortunately all too well, that Canada's Aboriginal peoples are
justified in worrying about government objectives that may be
superficially neutral but which constitute de facto threats to the existence.
of Aboriginal rights and interests."Il1 The relationship between the
government and Aboriginal peoples is to be "trust-like, rather than
adversarial."1 12 The Aboriginal perspective should be taken into account
when interpreting the rights at stake and government measures affecting
Aboriginal rights "must uphold the honour of the Crown and must be in
keeping with the unique contemporary relationship, grounded in history
and policy, between the Crown and Canada's Aboriginal peoples." 113
Important as these decisions were, Dickson recognized that Canada had
fallen well short of its moral obligation to respect and uphold the rights
of First Nations. After his retirement from the Court in 1990, he
continued to work towards the improvement of the relationship between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians, especially through his efforts
in establishing the basis for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples.114
110 Sparrow, supra note 108 at 1106.
111 Ibid. at 1110.
112 Ibid. at 1108.
113 Ibid. at 1110.
114 The work of the Commission culminated in a substantial report: see Canada, Report of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996) (Co-
chairs: R. Dussault & G. Erasmus). Hundreds of research reports and testimony from over two
thousand witnesses are preserved on CD-ROM: See For Seven Generations: An Information Legacy
of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Libraxus, 1997).
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D. Democracy
A central, perhaps preoccupying, issue of modern Canadian
constitutional law is the need to reconcile the power of judicial review-
implicit in the first three fundamental constitutional values I have
discussed-with the fourth value, democracy. Is it consistent with our
democratic values to permit unelected judges to strike down laws duly
passed by the elected representatives of the people?
I will suggest that a significant element of Brian Dickson's
constitutional legacy is the harmony he achieved between these
apparently competing constitutional values. His thinking rested on two
fundamental points, which were applicable both to judicial review on
federalism ground, and to judicial review for the protection of minorities
and fundamental rights and freedoms under the Charter. First, as
Dickson saw it, in both federalism and Charter cases the courts have no
choice but to exercise the power of judicial review, and in so doing they
are responding to, rather than reacting against, explicit democratic
choices. As Dickson explained:
The then prime minister, Mr. Trudeau, announced publicly that when it came to the
preservation and protection of civil rights of Canadians, he preferred to have that
responsibility entrusted to the courts rather than to the majority party that happened to
be in office at a particular time in Parliament or in a particular legislature of a province.
So it was clear that there was going to be a shift of power, and a very serious one, and one
carrying a great deal of weight.
1 1 5
Second, in the Dicksonian constitutional vision, judicial review is an
essential aspect of an ordered democracy, exercised to further and to
foster, not to frustrate, democratic values.11 6 I consider each of these
points, first in relation to federalism, and then with respect to
constitutionalism and the protection of minorities.
In a federal state, judicial review on division of powers grounds
seems inevitable. Canada could not exist as a single democratic state
without federalism, and for federalism to exist there has to be a referee
to resolve jurisdictional disputes. While one might imagine other ways or
other institutions to resolve jurisdictional disputes, the political process
has not displaced the courts and judicial review. Simply put, Dickson
viewed federalism as a conscious political choice and judicial review in
115 Portrait, supra note 1 at 31.
116 For a full development of this argument, see P.J. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution:
The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
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division of powers cases as a necessary and inevitable element of that
choice.
I suggest as well that Dickson's federalism jurisprudence was
informed by the values of democracy. As I have noted, he adopted a
relatively deferential posture in federalism cases, using a variety of
devices to avoid striking down laws. The result of deference and his
encouragement of overlapping authority was to uphold laws to the
greatest possible extent, thereby respecting the legislative choices of the
elected representatives, and, indirectly, encouraging the political actors
to work together to resolve differences. There is a clear parallel here to
the Court's response in the Patriation Reference,117 the most significant
federalism challenge it faced while Dickson was a member. Federal
unilateralism was rejected and the Court, in effect, forced the political
actors to return to the bargaining table to achieve a consensual
resolution.
There is, I suggest, a further element to Dickson's federalism
decisions that can be seen as aiding rather than impeding the processes
of democratic and political choice. An important element of Dickson's
functional approach to resolving federalism cases was his attempt to
locate jurisdiction at the level most suited to deal with the matter
through democratic choice. As the Court stated in the Secession
Reference, federalism "facilitates democratic participation by distributing
power to the government thought to be most suited to achieving the
particular societal objective having regard to [our] diversity." 118 This
consideration clearly motivated his thinking on the desirability of
provincial control over the administration of justice. He argued
foicefully that prosecutorial authority should be located at the provincial
level, where it would be sensitive to local concerns and conditions. The
provincial capacity element of his test for the exercise of federal
jurisdiction under the general branch of the trade and commerce
powerl1 9 also reflects his effort to locate authority at the level that best
fostered effective political choice and decisionmaking.
Dickson's approach to constitutionalism, the rule of law, and
judicial review under the Charter was also harmonized with his
perception of democracy. He saw the centrality of the rule of law, and an
independent judiciary as its guardian, as essential elements of an
ordered democracy. He categorically rejected the contention that
11 7 Supra note 2.
118 Supra note 4 at 251.
119 See Constitution Act, 1867 supra note 25, s. 91(2). See, also, General Motors, supra note 12.
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Charter adjudication was anti-democratic. As he and his colleagues have
frequently observed, 120 the Charter was a product of democratic choice.
To Dickson's mind, the language of the Constitution Act, 1982 left no
room for doubt that the political actors consciously imposed upon the
judiciary the duty to strike down laws that did not meet constitutional
muster and to grant appropriate and just remedies to vindicate Charter
rights. Dickson was keenly aware of the disappointing record of the
Supreme Court under the Bill of Rights,121 which he attributed in large
measure to the fact that it lacked constitutional pedigree. He saw the
entrenchment of the Charter, the explicit language of the supremacy1 22
and remedies clauses 123 as conscious and deliberate choices by the
political actors of the day. The generous and liberal interpretation
Dickson accorded the Charter was, in his view, not an unwarranted
assertion of judicial power, but a direct response to the invitation of the
political actors and a fulfillment of the widely held, and deeply felt,
expectations of the Canadian public.1 24
The second aspect of the harmonization of Charter review with
the values of democracy is the conscious attempt Dickson made in his
Charter jurisprudence to reflect the values of democracy in his
interpretation of guaranteed rights and freedoms. In a speech to the
Canadian Bar Association in 1983, just after the adoption of the Charter,
he said "I believe that the Charter is in line with our democratic
traditions and has the potential to enhance and strengthen them."125 In
the years to follow, Dickson frequently adverted to the needs of a
mature democracy when interpreting Charter rights and freedoms. The
Dicksonian vision integrates and harmonizes the constitutional
protection of minorities and individual rights with the democratic
process. It is, I suggest, a much richer version of democracy than raw
120 See, for example, Reference Re section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486 at 497, Lamer J.
121 Supra note 68, Part I. While a member of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, Dickson had
found a provision of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, that denied a widow the right to administer
the estate of her deceased husband, blatantly racist and contrary the guarantee of equality: see
Canard v. (A.G.) Canada (1972), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 9. The Supreme Court of Canada reversed his
judgment on the narrow valid federal objective test: see Canard v. Canada (A.G.), [1976] 1 S.C.R.
170.
12 2 Supra note 63, s. 52.
123 Ibid., s. 24.
12 4 See "Portrait," supra note 1 at 31.
125 B. Dickson, "The Supreme Court of Canada and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (Calgary, Canadian Bar Association, September 1983) [unpublished].
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majority rule in which the power of numbers prevails over all other
values. In Oakes, he wrote:
The court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide
variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. The
underlying values and principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a
limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable and
demonstrably justified.
126
Dickson frequently adverted to the needs of a mature democracy
when interpreting process. Dickson described freedom of expression as
"a crucial aspect of the democratic commitment, not merely because it
permits the best policies to be chosen from among a wide array of
proffered options, but additionally because it helps to ensure that
participation in the political process is open to all persons." 127 To him,
respect for individual rights and dignity was the underpinning of a
healthy democracy. In this conception, rights are accorded not to put the
individual at odds with the collectivity, but rather to confer upon the
individual the dignity and respect essential for full participation in
democratic and community life. When giving freedom of religion
generous scope in the Big M case, Dickson made a direct link to the
nature and demands of a democratic society: "[A]n emphasis on
individual conscience and individual judgment also lies at the heart of
our democratic political tradition. The ability of each citizen to make
free and informed decisions is the absolute prerequisite for the
legitimacy, acceptability and efficacy of our system of self-
government." 128
In a 1988 decision dealing with the presumption of innocence he,
described the "overarching principle of judicial review under the
Charter" as the need to ensure that legislatures do not infringe upon
certain fundamental rights in the name of the broader common good.129
He recognized that this could be viewed as a challenge to "the nature of
democratic institutions in Canada" as they represented the collective
voice of the community, but he rejected that analysis in favour of one
supportive of democracy:
126 Oakes, supra note 71'at 136.
12 7 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 764 [hereinafter Keegstra].
128 Big M, supra note 55 at 346.
129 R. v. Holmes, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 914 at 931.
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The infusion of the spirit of individual and collective democratic aspirations into the
process of defining the contours of constitutional guarantees ... ensures that the courts
are and will remain allies of Canadian democracy, strengthening any weaknesses of
democracy by providing a voice and a remedy for those excluded from equal and effective
democratic participation in our society. 130
Dickson's contribution to anti-discrimination jurisprudence and
his determination to protect religious and linguistic minorities, as well as
his effort to enhance the rights of Canada's indigenous peoples may be
seen as a rejection of the view that democracy is defined by majority rule
and nothing more. In Big M, he made explicit reference to the need to
protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority: "What may appear
good and true to a majoritarian religious group, or to the state acting at
their behest, may not, for religious reasons, be imposed upon citizens
who take a contrary view. The Charter safeguards religious minorities
from the threat of 'the tyranny of the majority."'1 31
Dickson's approach to section 1 and the justification of limits on
protected rights and freedoms was also strongly influenced by the need
to integrate democratic choice in relation to protected rights. In the first
place, he recognized that the courts were not alone in the struggle to
protect fundamental rights and freedoms. While he saw the courts as the
last resort and ultimate protector of constitutional values, he saw
Parliament and the legislatures as vital partners. He recognized that the
legislative arm had to be accorded reasonable scope when mediating
between competing claims, especially to protect vulnerable groups. This
line of analysis was expressed in a case dealing with Sunday closing
laws,' 32 where the Ontario legislature was attempting to reconcile the
claims of religious freedom, on the one hand, and the claims of
vulnerable retail workers to a day of rest, on the other. Dickson was
prepared to accord the legislature some latitude, as it was difficult to
identify an ideal solution. He noted that care had to be taken to ensure
that the Charter "does not simply become an instrument of better
situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the
improvement of the condition of less advantaged persons."133 He
applied this analysis to uphold legislation impinging upon a former
employer's freedom of expression by authorizing an arbitrator to require
130 Ibid. at 932.
131 Big M, supra note 55 at 337.
132 See R. v. Edwards Books andArt Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [hereinafter Edwards Books].
133 Ibid. at 779.
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an appropriate letter of reference.1 34 Dickson assessed this as "a
legislatively-sanctioned attempt to remedy the unequal balance of power
that normally exists between an employer and employee" 35 and
concluded that "constitutionally protecting freedom of expression would
be tantamount to condoning the continuation of an abuse of an already
unequal relationship."1 36
In Keegstra,137 Dickson found that the Criminal Code prohibition
of hate propaganda138 infringed freedom of expression. He also held
that this legislative measure could be justified under section 1 of the
Charter. I suggest that the significant feature of Dickson's Keegstra
judgment was his determinative assessment of the democratic values at
issue. In a collision between the right of freedom of expression and
fundamental democratic values, the values of democracy prevailed; not
on the ground that the law was the result of democratic choice, but
rather because he thought the hate propaganda prohibition protected
democratic values better than the asserted right to freedom of
expression. Dickson saw the anti-hate propaganda law as a legislative
initiative to enhance the very values underpinning the Charter, including
the universal right to equal dignity and respect, the right of minority
groups to be free from discrimination, and the right of all citizens to full
participation in the social and political life of the community without
vilification. He found that the harms caused by the hatemonger's
message ran "directly counter to the values central to a free and
democratic society, and in restricting the promotion of hatred
Parliament is therefore seeking to bolster the notion of mutual respect
necessary in a nation which venerates the equality of all persons."139
Dickson refused to place expression above other Charter values
in the pursuit of democracy: "expression can work to undermine our
commitment to democracy where employed to propagate ideas
anathemic to democratic values."1 40 As hate propaganda subverts the
democratic process, he found it to be a "brand of expressive activity ...
134 See Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
135 Ibid. at 1051.
136 Ibid. at 1052.
13 7 Keegstra, supra note 127.
138 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 319 (2).
139 Edwards Books, supra note 132 at 756.
140 Ibid. at 764.
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wholly inimical to the democratic aspirations of the free expression
guarantee."141
Finally, in relation to democracy and majority rule, it should be
noted that Dickson did hesitate to respect fully the Charter's majority
rule safety valve enshrined in section 33, the override or
"notwithstanding" clause. Despite his own serious personal misgivings as
to the propriety of allowing the majority to override fundamental rights
and freedoms, 42 Dickson accepted its inclusion in the Constitution as an
essential term of the political bargain that broke the 1982 impasse,143
and he joined the opinion of the Court establishing that the legitimacy of
a legislative decision to invoke the clause is not open to review except on
purely formal grounds.144
III. CONCLUSION
The legacy of Chief Justice Brian Dickson touches all the
fundamental values of Canada's Constitution. His judgments are
characterized by clarity of thinking and eloquence of expression. They
do more than decide the case at hand. They provide us with guidance
and inspiration for the future. Dickson's judicial work reflects a coherent
and integrated constitutional vision in which the fundamental values of
federalism, constitutionalism and the rule of law, the protection of
minorities and democracy work in harmony to provide a framework for
the flourishing of Canadian society.
141 Ibid.
142 See "Portrait," supra note 1 at 37.
143 See B. Dickson, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Its Interpretation by
the Courts" (Address, Princeton University, 25 April 1985) [unpublished, archived: National
Archives of Canada, MG31, E85, vol. 139, file 16].
14 4 See Fordv. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
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